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ABSTRACT 
 
Research summary  
Non-profit organizations in emerging markets frequently have to manage relations with 
governments and for-profit firms. We advance a multi-stakeholder perspective and develop 
propositions about how the political ties of charities influence their success in raising funds from 
corporate donors. Evidence from 2,054 Chinese charities during 2005-2012 shows that 
organizational political ties, established through formal affiliation with the government, aid 
fundraising from corporate donors, whereas personal political ties, formed through personal 
political services of senior leaders of charities, have no such effect. The positive effect of 
government affiliation is relevant for both foreign and domestic donors, but stronger for 
domestic ones. These results highlight the differential impact and contingent value of political 
embeddedness for charities’ ability to acquire resources from for-profit business, contributing to 
both stakeholder theory and the political embeddedness perspective.  
 
  
 
 
Managerial summary 
Non-profit organizations have to maintain productive relations with multiple stakeholders, 
including government and business. We focus on Chinese charities that seek to raise funds to 
fulfill their mission. We identify how their political relations influence the behavior of corporate 
donors. Evidence from 2,054 charities from 2005-2012 shows that political ties formed through 
organizational affiliation with a political body help charities attract corporate donors that seek 
legitimacy. In contrast, ties formed through personal connections with politicians have less 
influence on donors who perceive a high risk of connected insiders engaging in activities of 
dubious legality. The value of political ties is more pronounced for domestic corporate donors.  
 
 
Key words: charities, stakeholders, political ties, corporate donations, emerging markets  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“At the beginning, we were very naive and never thought about the misappropriation 
problem of our donations to non-profits. However, we started to be aware of that and 
became skeptical…We hope they (non-profits) can be more professional and 
transparent.” 
Interviewed representative of a major Chinese corporate donor 
 
The non-profit sector plays a crucial role in advancing economic and social development in 
emerging markets. As the United Nations Development Programme (2015) notes, philanthropy 
requires collaboration between non-profit organizations, business, and government. Non-profit 
organizations—such as charities—rely on governments to regulate, and to provide legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, charities depend on funding from for-profit firms to deliver civic services. How to 
manage their relationships with multiple stakeholders is complicated for non-profit organizations 
because they lack the focus on profit maximization that can aid in prioritizing stakeholders’ 
claims for corporations (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004).  
The challenge is to understand how charities maintain productive relations simultaneously 
with the government and for-profit donors. Close ties to governments in emerging markets help 
organizations navigate uncertainty and access resources (Haveman et al., 2017). Nevertheless, 
political ties are not unambiguously beneficial, because politicians may extract much of the value 
that they help generate (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) in markets lacking adequate governance 
(Sun, Hu, and Hillman, 2016). Further, organizations’ relationships with one group of 
stakeholders can influence their relations with other groups (Rowley, 1997). Thus, politically 
connected charities might attract corporate donors who seek political legitimacy but could also 
risk losing donations from for-profit firms who worry about politicians misappropriating funds. 
Non-profits must tread carefully to address the expectations of both government and business.  
We take up the above challenge in examining the nexus of non-profit organizations, for-
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profit business, and government. We ask: under what conditions are political ties beneficial for 
non-profits’ resource acquisition from business? We engage and extend two streams of literature: 
stakeholder theory and theories of embeddedness. Stakeholder theory acknowledges that 
relations with one stakeholder group can influence relations with others (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). Theories of embeddedness highlight the opportunities and constraints provided by 
boundary-spanning relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Political embeddedness, 
defined as “bureaucratic, instrumental, or affective ties to the state and its actors” (Michelson, 
2007: 352), is especially pertinent in emerging markets due to the frequent intervention of 
political actors and weak monitoring in these markets. Our contingency perspective recognizes 
that not all political ties are equally effective in facilitating charities’ relations with business and 
that not all corporate donors are alike. Specifically, we distinguish political ties formed through 
government affiliation (organizational embeddedness) from those arising out of senior leaders’ 
personal political service (personal embeddedness). Similarly, we delineate how different donors 
evaluate charities’ political ties based on their own needs for political legitimacy.   
We examine these relationships using panel data on 2,054 Chinese charities over the period 
from 2005 to 2012. Our findings highlight the differential impacts of organizational and personal 
embeddedness for charities’ ability to acquire resources from for-profit business. The former, 
established through formal government affiliation, has a positive effect on corporate donations, 
whereas the latter, established through the position interlocks between charity leaders and 
politicians, has no such effect. The positive effect of government affiliation is relevant for both 
foreign and domestic donors, but stronger for domestic ones who expect to gain more. In 
illustrating our arguments, we also provide representative qualitative evidence from field data 
collected with the aim of shedding light on why firms donate to some charities rather than others 
5 
 
(see Appendix A).  
We forge a link between stakeholder research and the management of non-profit 
organizations by integrating stakeholder theory and the political embeddedness perspective. We 
draw attention to the consequences of political ties for a focal organization by influencing the 
willingness of other stakeholders to provide resources. Therefore, our multi-stakeholder 
perspective adds to the under-researched area of the indirect consequences of political 
embeddedness. We also extend the political embeddedness perspective by highlighting that ties 
with the government (one essential stakeholder group) create both benefits and risks for charities 
in gaining resources from corporate donors (another essential stakeholder group), depending on 
the nature of the embeddedness as well as the needs of the resource providers.   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Charities, like other organizations, must balance the interests and expectations of competing 
stakeholders (see Freeman, 2010; Mahoney and McGahan, 2007). Among these, corporate 
donors and the government are two critically important stakeholder groups. Charities in 
emerging markets depend heavily on business for funding (Ni and Zhan, 2017). At the same 
time, they depend on the government to regulate their activity and provide legitimacy (Ma, 
2006). Balancing these competing interests may be more challenging for charities than for for-
profit firms given that the latter usually have a single most important stakeholder group—
shareholders—whose interests take priority (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004). In the following section, we will develop theory on how relationships with the 
government create benefits and risks for charities’ potential donors.  
Political Embeddedness and Corporate Donations 
6 
 
Political embeddedness refers to an organization’s ongoing structural relations to the state and its 
actors (Michelson, 2007). These relations are simultaneously instrumental and affective as trust 
develops and favors are exchanged (Michelson, 2007). We provide an overview of research on 
political embeddedness in Table 1, distinguishing research on the for-profit and the non-profit 
space in developed and emerging markets.  
*** Table 1 about here*** 
A body of work examines the consequences of political ties for for-profit firms’ success 
(Faccio, 2006). Benefits include obtaining market access (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001), 
influence over regulation (Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh, 2006), enhanced legitimacy 
(Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999), and privileged access to state-controlled resources 
(Bertrand et al., 2004; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009) and to information (Lester et al., 2008). 
Ties between organizations and political actors are found to have similar, yet greater, benefits in 
emerging markets (Puffer, McCarthy, and Peng, 2013) because political ties help fill the 
institutional void arising from the lack of market intermediaries (Luo and Chung, 2005; 
Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Peng and Luo, 2000). But, there are also costs of being politically 
connected. Political connections can subject firms to pressure to bestow favors on politicians 
(Bertrand et al., 2004), to the misappropriation of value by blockholders (Sun et al., 2016), and 
to government monitoring (Marquis and Qian, 2014).  
Similarly, benefits and costs associated with political embeddedness also exist in non-profit 
organizations. As shown in Table 1, research indicates some benefits specific to the non-profit 
context, such as learning effects (Selsky and Parker, 2005) and policy advocacy as well as 
broadened service scope (Zhan and Tang, 2016). Moreover, the dyanmics between non-profits 
and the state in emerging markets differ from those in developed markets. Supportive policies 
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(e.g., tax-exempt status, fiscal subsidies) to nurture the non-profit sector are usually lacking in 
emerging markets (Kim and Kim, 2015). The absence of policy support makes political 
connections particularly useful. However, the weak legal system and monitoring in these 
economies render disproportionately strong power to the state and political insiders, exposing 
politically connected non-profits to the risk of losing their independence (Selsky and Parker, 
2005). Thus, the influence—both positive and negative—of the government may be stronger in 
emerging markets.    
We seek to disentangle the potential positive and negative consequences of political 
embeddedness for non-profits’ success in raising funds from business. We develop a theoretical 
framework and propose that ties with the government can help charities to raise funds from 
business. They do so by conferring political legitimacy to corporations that donate to approved 
causes. However, drawing on theories of embeddedness, we argue that political ties are not 
equally effective and that some potentially jeopardize charities’ relationships with business. 
Further, drawing on stakeholder theory, we also argue that not all corporations will care equally 
about charities’ political ties. Figure 1 summarizes our framework, which we detail below.  
*** Figure 1 about here*** 
Political embeddedness signaling access to legitimacy  
Corporations are motivated to make charitable donations in pursuit of political legitimacy (Wang 
and Qian, 2011; Zhang, Marquis, and Qiao, 2016). Political legitimacy is conferred by state 
endorsement, which recognizes an organization’s objectives as desirable and consistent with 
political values. It is a process whereby “government officials accept a venture as appropriate 
and right, given existing norms and laws” (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994: 648). Governments look 
favorably on charitable donations by corporations because they alleviate governmental resource 
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constraints and benefit society. For corporations, in turn, “legitimate status is a sine qua non for 
easy access to resources, unrestricted access to markets, and long term survival” (Brown, 1998: 
35).   
Relatively little is known, however, about whether corporations donate more to politically 
connected charities and to what extent political connections attract corporate funds. Plausibly, 
charities with political ties provide corporate donors with channels for building political 
legitimacy. Whilst political ties directly confer legitimacy to charities and to the causes they 
champion, this legitimacy can extend to donors who support the same charities. Donating in 
return for political legitimacy might be particularly prevalent in emerging markets where other 
means available for building political ties are limited (Peng and Luo, 2000). Thus, corporations 
sometimes advance their own interests by supporting legitimate organizations and legitimate 
causes. One senior executive we interviewed at a Chinese charity explained how political ties 
helped his charity attract corporate donations: 
“(The reason why they make donations to us) is related to our government 
background. With the associated credibility, we have attracted many companies and 
individuals. It is (our charity’s) comparative advantage.” 
 
Political embeddedness as a liability 
At the same time, embeddedness may constrain the new relationships that an organization 
can form (Jiang et al., 2017). A charity’s political ties can give rise to concerns and risks for 
donors. Concerns arise from politically connected insiders’ use of charitable giving for private 
gain. Political ties increase the chance of rent appropriation by dominant insiders. They may, for 
example, install unqualified cronies in the organization to reinforce their interests (Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang, 2007) or transfer away assets through self-dealing transactions (Sun et al., 2016). 
Such risks from political connections may be particularly salient in emerging markets due to 
9 
 
weak governance and monitoring. Politicians in diverse emerging markets sometimes misuse 
philanthropic funds (HRW, 2007; Luo, 2006), leading to scandals (He and Liu, 2011).  
Corporate donors can see their businesses harmed by negative spillovers from malfeasence 
even if they are uninvolved in the wrongdoing (Jonsson, Greve and Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). 
Stigma is contagious, so that the partners of organizations accused of wrongdoing are liable to 
suffer from social disapproval (Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008). Incidents of malfeasance may 
cause a charity’s donors to lose legitimacy as well. Awareness of this risk may discourage donors 
and hurt well-connected charities. Firms reduce philanthropic giving when they fear that 
donations may be embezzled by corrupt politicians (Luo, 2006). Our field interviews with 
corporate donors confirmed this concern (as shown in the epigraph); their skepticism towards 
politically connected charities was marked.    
Non-profits’ political embeddedness can thus attract or hurt corporate donations. On 
balance, we contend that the potential benefits outweigh the risks. After all, emerging market 
governments enjoy wide discretion in allocating and regulating the use of state-controlled 
resources including government funding, legal protection, license approval, and preferential 
access to infrastructure and information. Seeking approval from the government and maintaining 
its goodwill are often of paramount importance for businesses (Li and Zhang, 2007; Peng and 
Luo, 2000). Corporate donors, through making donations to politically connected charities, may 
gain political legitimacy and therefore better access to resources. This legitimacy is valuable for 
firms operating in the face of heavy government intervention (Zhan and Tang, 2016), as in many 
emerging markets. In such contexts, political ties can minimize legal and social sanctions even if 
misconduct is revealed (Sun et al., 2016). The benefits provided by political ties thus tend to 
outweigh the costs. We thus start with the baseline hypothesis that the fundraising benefits of 
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political ties will exceed the associated costs.  
Hypothesis 1 [H1]. Politically embedded charities will receive a higher volume of 
corporate donations than will charities without political ties. 
 
Beyond the baseline prediction, we identify two contingencies that shape the effect of 
embeddedness on charities’ fundraising performance, following our two overarching theories 
(political embeddedness perspective and stakeholder theory): the form of embeddedness and the 
identity of corporate donors, with which the benefits and liabilities of being embedded vary.  
The Form of Embeddedness: Organizational vs. Personal Political Ties 
Not all forms of political embeddedness are equally appealing for donors, because ties created 
through different channels entail different costs and benefits (Zhang et al., 2016; Zheng, Singh, 
and Mitchell, 2015). We distinguish organizational political embeddedness from personal 
political embeddedness. Organizational embeddedness exists when the ties between an 
organization and the state involve a formal government affiliation. Examples of such ties include 
government contracts and partnerships between the state and non-profits (Selsky and Parker, 
2005). The state can even be directly involved in non-profits in emerging markets; non-profit 
organizations such as charities may be founded or co-founded by the government (Ni and Zhan, 
2017; Zhang et al., 2016). 
In contrast, personal embeddedness is created by individuals taking positions in both 
organizational and political spheres (Hillman, 2005; Hite, 2003; Sun et al., 2015). Thus, this 
form of political embeddedness is fundamentally personal in nature. Charitable organizations in 
emerging markets can be politically connected on a personal level by having current or retired 
politicians serving on their boards or management teams (Zhan and Tang, 2016). The distinction 
between organizational and personal political embeddedness is important because political ties 
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function differently when they are formalized at the organizational level versus when they are 
personal and dependent on individual actors (Sun et al., 2015).  
Organizational ties created by government affiliation provide greater benefits than personal 
ties. First, a formal and direct link to the government constitutes an official source of legitimacy 
and embeds the charity directly within political institutions (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Next, 
organizational political ties have broader reach than personal ties in generating a wider network 
across various political agencies rather than the limited number of agencies to which any 
individual politician is linked. In addition, formal affiliation with the government implies 
continued support during crises and changes to the fate of individual politicians (Okhmatovskiy, 
2010). In this way, organizational political ties are more resilient than personal ties during 
external shocks (Sun et al., 2015). In contrast, political ties formed through individuals are 
narrower in their scope of influence and thus less likely to provide benefits. They are also less 
robust in the face of political change (Siegel, 2007). For example, a senior leader in a charity 
stressed in an interview with us that the mobility of politicians rendered personal political ties 
less valuable:   
“The directors on our board with political backgrounds are mostly from XXX 
Committee (name hidden as requested). Their presence on the board represents their 
positions in this political committee. What matters to us (i.e. charities) is actually the 
political position rather than the individuals… The mobility of officials in XXX 
Committee (name hidden as requested) is high. If the person changes his/her work, 
his/her position in our charity will also be changed.”  
 
Political insiders who misappropriate organizational assets at the cost of other stakeholders 
represent a high risk for donors. Political ties created by individuals pose greater risk than formal 
government affiliation. Personal political ties often involve a reciprocal exchange of favors (Park 
and Luo, 2001), which itself is inherently risky if community standards disapprove of bribery. 
Intensive interpersonal exchanges may lead to connected insiders seeking private gains. 
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Evidence from for-profit firms shows a negative effect of directors’ political connections on 
financial performance (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). The pursuit of private gains weakens 
governance and dilutes firms’ accountability. For example, politically connected CEOs appoint 
political allies to their boards rather than directors with business experience or professional 
backgrounds (Fan et al., 2007). Connected insiders, particularly in weakly-regulated markets, 
such as Indonesia and China, engage in undisclosed related-party transactions benefiting 
themselves and their political cronies (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Charities are unlikely to 
be immune to such goings-on. Misappropriation may be even more prevalent in the non-profit 
sector in emerging markets due to weaker governance and a lack of sophisticated watchdog 
organizations (Ma, 2006).   
The risk of misappropriation through personal ties is heightened by the short tenure of 
politically connected individuals on charities’ boards (Sheng, Zhou, and Li, 2011). Connected 
individuals may be more motivated to appropriate organizational assets for personal gain during 
a limited tenure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Conversely, charities risk having “the wrong friends 
at the wrong time” if an individual politician falls out of favor (Siegel, 2007: 621). In contrast, 
organizational political ties that are less dependent on interpersonal attachment and exchanges 
(Sun et al., 2015) are usually more stable over time. In sum, organizational political ties create 
greater benefits and lower risks for potential donors. Therefore, the net benefits for 
organizational ties are greater than that for personal ties. We propose: 
Hypothesis 2 [H2]. The relationship between political embeddedness  
and corporate donations received is stronger for charities with organizational political ties 
(organizational embeddedness) than for those with personal political ties (personal 
embeddedness). 
 
The Identity of Donors: Foreign vs. Domestic Donors 
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The stakeholder perspective highlights that any single stakeholder group consists of actors with 
different motivations and priorities (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014). Therefore, it is important to 
take a more fine-tuned perspective by distinguishing different types of corporate donors, who 
differ in their perceptions of benefits and risks from engaging in philanthropy.  
Both domestic and foreign firms seek legitimacy (Stevens, Xie, and Peng, 2016), but 
domestic donors usually perceive greater potential in politically connected charities because they 
depend more on domestic political entities. In contrast, multinational enterprises depend less on 
host country governments. Being multinational provides benefits such as the ability to access 
resources in different locations, to obtain information from multiple environments, and to spread 
risk (Dunning, 1993), all of which reduce dependence on any single host country government. 
Foreign firms thus have less incentive to donate to politically connected charities in search of 
endorsement. In any case, multinational firms typically enter overseas markets on the basis of 
proprietary advantages over domestic firms to compensate for the additional costs associated 
with doing business abroad (Caves, 1996; Hymer, 1960). They make primarily market-based, 
impersonal, transactions in a host economy, whereas domestic firms in emerging markets are 
accustomed to coordinating exchanges through their connections (Boisot and Child, 1996; Li, 
Poppo and Zhou, 2008; Peng, 2003). This makes foreign firms less likely to discern advantages 
in co-opting host country politicians through philanthropy. Research confirms that political ties 
are less valuable for foreign firms operating in countries such as China than for domestic players 
(Li et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, the perceived risks in a charity’s political connectedness are higher for 
foreign donors. The non-profit sector in an emerging market offers little transparency, 
insufficient professionalism, and a lack of third party oversight (Zhan and Tang, 2016). The weak 
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governance regime creates greater information asymmetry for foreign donors, while domestic 
donors have superior access to information through their embedded social relations, including 
information related to misappropriation behavior. Added to this, multinational firms’ reliance on 
market-based, rather than relationship-based, strategies (Peng, 2003) renders them less adept at 
preventing or dealing with reputational crises arising from misconduct by connected insiders. 
They may also worry about the consequences for their reputation at home by being seen to 
collaborate with organizations affiliated with a government that may itself lack legitimacy in the 
eyes of, for example, U.S. consumers (Stevens et al., 2016). They thus perceive greater risk in 
dealing with politically connected charities and may be more circumspect in donating to them.  
In sum, domestic firms will perceive greater benefits and less risk in politically connected 
charities than their foreign counterparts. Any positive relationship between political 
embeddedness and fundraising should thus be more pronounced when donors are domestic.  
Hypothesis 3a [H3a]. The relationship between political embeddedness  
and corporate donations received is stronger for domestic than for foreign  
corporate donors.  
 
Moreover, in addition to making more donations, domestic corporations may be more 
discriminating than their foreign peers when it comes to assessing which politically connected 
charities are the most promising for them to donate to. By virtue of their local knowledge—
especially of the local political context that may be less comprehensible to outsiders (Taussig and 
Delios, 2015)—they have a more informed understanding of which political ties are the most 
beneficial and the most durable. For one, domestic firms will have witnessed how policies 
fluctuate and politicians rise and fall. Being connected to a politicial institution provides shelter. 
If organizational political ties are perceived to provide greater influence and stability than 
personal political ties, charities with organizational ties may be prioritized when domestic firms 
15 
 
make donations. In contrast, foreign firms may be less discriminating and, thus, more likely to 
view different forms of political ties as equivalent. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3b [H3b]. The positive moderating effect for attracting donations from 
domestic corporations (vis-à-vis foreign corporations) is stronger for charities with 
organizational political ties than for those with personal political ties.  
 
Taken together then, our hypotheses imply that different forms of political embeddness have 
differential effects on charities’ success in raising funds from corporate donors. These effects are 
moderated by the identity of the donors (domestic or foreign).  
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
China offers a suitable empirical context to examine different types of political embeddedness 
and stakeholder relationship management in non-profits. China is a leading emerging market, 
characterized by the absence, insufficiency, or poor enforcement of rules related to economic, 
political, or social institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Despite economic reform, state 
control over key resources such as land, bank loans, and permits continues. Politicians have long 
intervened in business and non-profits.  
Our study focuses on philanthropic foundations in China, which are established with an 
endowment and are managed by their own trustees and directors. Each devotes philanthropic 
resources to a set of social issues. In China, the first philanthropic foundation was established in 
1981, and foundations have since grown rapidly. There were over 6,000 philanthropic 
foundations in China at the end of 2017. Regulations support their development, including the 
Regulation for the Management of Foundations (1988) and the Regulation on Foundation 
Administration (2014) by the State Council, and a series of policies on registration, information 
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disclosure, and annual assessment of foundations by the Ministry of Civil Affairs1.  
Generous corporate giving also explains the growth of these philanthropic foundations. 
Donations typically come from different sources in emerging markets than in economies with 
mature non-profit sectors. Corporate donations account for around two-thirds of charitable giving 
in China versus around 5% in the U.S. (Lin et al., 2015). In recent years, in pursuit of legitimacy 
and social capital, Chinese corporations have been engaged in philanthropy in the context of 
national corporate social responsibility programs (Ni, Qian, and Crilly, 2014; Wang and Qian, 
2011). Table 2 outlines the rapid growth in the number of foundations and volume of total 
donations during our study period2. 
*** Table 2 about here*** 
The independence of the non-profit sector is nonetheless constrained in many emerging 
markets (Selsky and Parker, 2005). In China, politically connected charities have been involved 
in numerous misappropriation scandals, and the most prominent scandals jeopardize the 
reputations of even well-governed politically connected charities (see Grant and Potoski, 2015, 
for a similar idea on how reputation can be contagious)3. Government-connected charities may 
be perceived skeptically as a result of concerns surrounding their lack of professionalism and 
effective governance (Zhan and Tang, 2016). Furthermore, external monitoring is weak (Ni and 
Zhan, 2017). Philanthropic foundations in China thus provide an intriguing research setting for 
exploring the complex relationships between non-profits, the state, and the private sector.   
                                                     
1 These regulations are intended to ensure the adequate governance of philanthropic foundations rather than directly 
to influence donation behavior. Our data extend to 2012, i.e. before the enactment of the Regulation on Foundation 
Administration. 
2 The fall in foreign donations from 2011 to 2012 was a result of the Guo Meimei scandal (Ni and Zhan, 2017).  
3 Infamous scandals include the Guo Meimei scandal involving alleged misappropriation of funds at the Chinese 
Red Cross in 2011 (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-07/15/content_12912148.htm) and accusations of 
money laundering levied at the China Charities Aid Foundation for Children in the same year. 
(http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/BeijingInformation/BeijingNewsUpdate/t1291202.htm).  
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Our data are compiled from the annual reports of Chinese philanthropic foundations from 
2005 to 20124. Table 2 shows that the sample represents about 83% of the population, rising to 
more than 90% in recent years as a result of increasing disclosure. Since 2004, the government 
has required philanthropic foundations to provide audited annual reports to the public. These 
reports include data on the founders, the backgrounds of key members as well as financial 
figures. Annual reports are often available from these foundations’ websites. Otherwise, we 
accessed reports from government-affiliated websites such as those of China’s Ministry of Civil 
Affairs and major provincial civil affairs bureaus. Information from the China Foundation Center 
(CFC), the most influential, independent non-profit which discloses information about 
philanthropic foundations in China, was also considered in order to maximize the number of 
useable annual reports. (For more details about the CFC, see Nie et al., 2016.)  
During our analysis period, some foundations were established and some may have left the 
sample, creating an unbalanced panel (Sayrs, 1989). A potential source of bias lies in the exit of 
foundations from our sample. If foundations exit because of poor fundraising performance, and 
politically embedded foundations are more (or less) likely to exit, an analysis based on the 
remaining foundations might be misleading. We therefore checked our sample for all cases of 
exit but identified only several. We assessed whether foundations with higher level of political 
embeddedness were more likely to exit. Neither organizational nor personal political 
embeddedness predicted the likelihood of exit. This confirms that potential survivor bias is less 
of concern for our study. The final sample covered an unbalanced panel of 2,054 charities during 
the 2005 to 2012 period. All independent variables were lagged by one year in the analyses. 
                                                     
4 According to the Overseas NGO Law, foreign charities cannot accept donations in China. This makes our 
empirical context neater as we do not have to consider the choice that firms might otherwise face to donate to 
Chinese charities or to foreign charities operating in China.  
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Measures  
Corporate donations received. Our dependent variable is total donations, the sum of corporate 
donations received annually by a charity. The data were extracted from the philanthropic 
foundations’ annual reports from 2005 to 20125. To distinguish between foreign and domestic 
corporate donors, total donations was disaggregated into donations from domestic firms and 
donations from foreign firms. We took the logarithmic form of all three variables to reduce 
skewness. We also identified the ratio of corporate donations to total donations received, and we 
used this variable in our robustness analyses.  
Political embeddedness. We assessed the background of each charity and its senior leadership 
team to identify political embeddedness. Organizational political embeddedness was coded “1” 
if the charity’s founding members involved a political or quasi-political entity such as a Political 
Consultative Conference, a labor union, a women’s federation, a federation of returned overseas 
Chinese, or any entity under the direct leadership of the Communist Party (Ni and Zhan, 2017). 
If no such entity was involved, organizational political embeddedness was coded “0”. Following 
previous research in the corporate setting (Hillman et al., 1999), a charity’s personal political 
embeddedness was quantified as a count of positional interlocking ties between the charity and 
the political entities involving charity’s senior leaders (e.g. Chairman, Vice-chairman, General-
secretary) each year6. A tie was recorded if a charity’s senior leader held or had previously held a 
senior position in a key unit of the government, the Communist Party, or one of China’s two 
legislative bodies. Definitions of senior political positions are provided in Table 2 (Note c). Table 
                                                     
5 The reports distinguish donations from individual citizens from those from institutional donors and separately list 
the subsidy from the government (if any). The institutional donors are overwhelmingly corporate donors. This is in 
line with Zhang et al.’s (2016) assertion that corporations are dominant in institutional philanthropy in China. 
6 Government regulations started to forbid current or retired officials taking up leadership roles in non-profits in 
more recent years, for example, as shown in The Notice of Regulating the Re-employment of Retired Officials to 
Part-time Positions in Social Groups (article #11 by the Organization Department, CCCPC, 2014/06/25). This law 
was ratified after the end of our observation period in 2012.   
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2 also provides information on the charities’ government affiliation and personal political ties for 
each of our sample years. The variable political embeddedness was created based on a charity’s 
organizational and personal political embeddedness, taking the value of “1” if a charity is 
embedded in organizational or personal political relations, and “0” otherwise.  
Control Variables 
We controlled for variables that potentially influence fundraising performance. We measured a 
foundation’s size as the logarithm of its total assets at the end of the fiscal year (Ni and Zhan, 
2017). Age was the number of years since establishment (Suárez, 2011). The variable public 
qualification indicated a charity had the right to conduct public fundraising. It was coded “1” for 
a foundation with such a right and “0” if it could only raise funds privately. Whether the charity 
served citizens nationwide or only locally was another control that influences fundraising 
(Suárez, 2011). A variable, national, was coded “1” if the charity served citizens nationwide, or 
“0” if local. Superior charity governance may attract donations (Harris, Petrovits, and Yetman 
2015). Hence, we controlled for the audit quality based on whether a charity’s auditor was from 
China’s top 100 national accounting firms in that calendar year (Kitching, 2009). An annual 
ranking of China’s top 100 reputable national accounting firms is published by the Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A variable audit quality was coded “1” if a charity’s 
auditor was on the list, or “0” otherwise. Demonstrating professionalism could influence a 
charity’s fundraising, so we created a professionalization index (ranging from 0 to 1) based on 
whether the charity had its own newsletter and website and the percentage of its personnel 
working full-time (Hwang and Powell, 2009). Number of service domains controlled for 
charities’ scope of operation and was a count of the service domains a charity operated in7. In 
                                                     
7 Chinese charities operate in seven domains: (1) the arts, culture, and humanities, (2) education, (3) environment 
and animals, (4) health, (5) human services, (6) foreign affairs, and (7) public, societal benefits. 
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addition, service domain dummies were included to indicate the primary service domain.  
Fundraising expenses was the logarithm of each charity’s total fundraising expenses 
(Fischer, Wilsker, and Young, 2011). We also controlled for two alternative sources of funding 
for charities: funding from the government and from the general public. Government subsidy was 
the logarithm of subsidy provided by the government. Government subsidies may either attract 
or crowd out donations from firms (Brooks, 2000). Public donations recorded the sum (logged) 
of donations received from the general public. Prior fundraising performance was the sum of 
corporate donations received in the previous year.  
Controls for economic and institutional influences included the value of province GDP per 
capita as well as provincial institutional development. The GDP data were collected from China 
Statistical Yearbooks. Provinces’ institutional development was measured using the index of 
marketization in Chinese provinces published annually by the National Economic Research 
Institute, which has been widely used by management scholars (Fan, Wang, and Zhu, 2011; 
Wang and Qian, 2011). The index is available only to 2009, so following the approach of prior 
research (Sun et al., 2016), we allowed for a longer lag in this variable to predict its effect on 
donations. For instance, donations received in 2012 are regressed on the corresponding 
marketization index in 20098. Finally, a set of year dummies was created to control for trends.  
Estimation Method 
Random-effects models for panel data are employed for estimation. One of our key independent 
variables – organizational political embeddedness – was time invariant, so fixed-effects 
estimations would have been inappropriate. Random effects models are also appropriate as our 
theoretical interest is in between-charity variance.  
                                                     
8 As an alternative, the values were extrapolated to fill in the missing two years. Results remained.  
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As political ties formed through charity leaders (personal political embeddedness) may not 
be randomly distributed among charities and since the factors leading to the formation of such 
ties may also be related to fundraising success, we adopted two-stage Heckman models 
(Heckman, 1979) to control for the establishment of personal political embeddedness. As a first 
step, we estimated a charity’s propensity to establish political ties through its senior leaders using 
a probit regression including all the observable exogenous (control) variables and two additional 
unobservable variables. The two additional variables are (1) Male ratio, measured as the ratio of 
male leaders on board for each charity annually, and (2) Leader age, measured as the average age 
of board members for each charity annually. The gender of the senior leaders may influence the 
political participation of these individuals (Paxton and Hughes, 2015) and, in turn, the 
interlocking personal political ties of the charities. The age of firm leaders influences firm-level 
political strategy (Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006; Jia, 2014).  
The results (presented in Appendix B) show that charities with older leaders and fewer 
males on their boards are more likely to establish personal political ties. Neither variable had a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable. In addition, larger and more professional 
charities, charities that served their local communities, operated in more service domains, and 
received more government subsidies and lower amounts of public donations were more likely to 
establish political ties through their senior leaders. As a second step, we included the inverse 
Mill’s ratio obtained from the first stage regression in the main models.  
RESULTS 
We report in Table 3 descriptive statistics of our sample firms and the pair-wise correlations 
between the variables in our models. The independent variables were only moderately correlated 
with an average VIF (variance inflation factor) score of 1.76 for the final model. No item scored 
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higher than 5 (the highest score was 4.76), well below the generally accepted threshold of 10. 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
Table 4 presents the results of the random-effects GLS regressions. The dependent variable 
in models 1–3 is the total volume of corporate donations (logged). In models 4–6, it is the 
volume of donations from foreign firms (logged), and in models 7–9 it is the volume of 
donations from domestic firms (logged). Model 1 predicting total corporate donations is the 
baseline model, containing all control variables. Large and younger charities, charities with 
national scope, high levels of professionalization and spending on fundraising attracted more 
corporate donations. Models 4 and 7 are baseline models predicting donations from foreign firms 
and domestic firms, respectively. Results for these two dependent variables are largely consistent 
with those in Model 1. Charities with higher audit quality attracted more donations from foreign 
firms but not from domestic firms, suggesting that foreign corporations pay attention to formal 
signals of governance (rather than discriminate between the forms of charities’ political ties). 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
Model 2 adds political embeddedness to test Hypothesis 1. As predicted, political 
embeddedness is positively associated with total corporate donations (b = 1.13, p = 0.000). A 
change in political embeddedness from 0 to 1 is associated with 1.13 unit of change in total 
corporate donations (logged), holding other variables constant. This means that charities with 
political ties received US$3.09 million more in corporate donations than their unconnected 
peers9. The plotted marginal effect (Figure (a) in Appendix C) confirms this result. Hypothesis 1 
is supported.  
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2 that distinguishes between organizational political 
                                                     
9 Exp(1.13) = 3.09 
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embeddedness and personal political embeddedness. While organizational political 
embeddedness has a positive effect (b = 1.16, p = 0.000), personal political embeddedness has no 
discernible effect on corporate donations received and the sign is negative (b = -0.02, p = 0.713). 
A change from 0 to 1 in organizational political embeddedness is associated with 1.16 unit of 
change in total corporate donations (logged), holding other variables constant. This means that 
charities embedded in organizational political ties received US$3.19 million more in corporate 
donations than peers without such embeddedness10. A test shows that the two coefficients are 
statistically different (p < 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 2 that political ties at the organizational 
level have a stronger positive impact on fundraising performance than do ties at the individual 
level. The overall positive effect of political embeddedness is driven by ties at the organizational 
level rather than personal level, confirming the value in disaggregating political ties.  
Hypotheses 3a and 3b distinguish between foreign (models 5 and 6) and domestic (models 8 
and 9) corporate donors. Hypothesis 3a predicts that the positive effect of political embeddedness 
will be stronger for domestic donors due to their greater dependence on the government. The 
coefficients for political embeddedness in Model 5 (b = 0.44, p = 0.002) and Model 8 (b = 1.21, 
p = 0.000) show a positive impact of political embeddedness for both donor types. Specifically, 
charities with political ties received US$1.55 million more from foreign corporate donors and 
US$3.35 million more from domestic corporate donors, relative to peers without political ties, 
holding all other variables constant11. A test reveals that these two coefficients are significantly 
different, providing support for Hypothesis 3a12. Our plots of marginal effects (Figures (b) and 
(c) in Appendix C) also confirm this result, further supporting Hypothesis 3a.  
                                                     
10 Exp(1.16) = 3.19 
11 Exp(0.44) = 1.55; Exp(1.21) = 3.35 
12 A seemingly unrelated regression (-SUEST-) was performed to compare the coefficients in the two different 
models, relying on pooled OLS regression clustering for foundations.  
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Models 6 and 9 distinguish the effects of both forms of embeddedness on donations from 
different donors. The positive effect of organizational political embeddedness is weaker for 
foreign corporate donors (Model 6: b = 0.53, p = 0.001) than for domestic donors (Model 9: b = 
1.22, p = 0.000). Specifically, charities with organizational political ties received US$1.70 
million more from foreign corporate donors and US$3.39 million more from domestic corporate 
donors, relative to peers without such ties, holding other variables constant13. Test statistics show 
a significant difference between the two coefficients, in support of Hypothesis 3b. Personal 
political embeddedness shows no significant relationship with either type of corporate donations. 
So, Hypothesis 3b was supported—political ties at the organizational level (but not the personal 
level) are more effective for attracting domestic donors than for foreign ones.   
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES  
We applied alternate modeling approaches and alternate measures of key variables to test the 
robustness of our findings. We estimated fixed-effects models without time-constant variables. 
The results for personal political embeddedness remained the same in models for all three 
dependent variables. Second, as an alternative to our Heckman’s (1979) selection models, we 
employed an instrumental variable approach, estimating random-effects models using male ratio 
and leader age as instruments. The results were substantially the same. In addition, we replaced 
the absolute volume of corporate donations with the ratio of corporate donations to total 
donations as the dependent variable. Results were consistent with what we report above, 
providing even stronger support for our prediction that domestic donors are especially attracted 
to politically connected charities. Fourth, we repeated our analyses with the logarithmic 
transformation of the count of personal political ties, and the results remained. Finally, to check 
                                                     
13 Exp(0.53) = 1.70; Exp(1.22) = 3.39 
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for potential reverse causality, we regressed donations received in year t on the charities’ two 
types of political ties in year t+1. No significant relationship was found.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our research was motivated by the question of how charitable organizations manage one 
constituency (the government) to influence another constituency (corporate donors). Our study 
forges a link between scholarship on non-profit organizations and stakeholder management by 
studying the political embeddedness of these organizations. We make two central contributions. 
First, our study advances a multi-stakeholder view of organizations by viewing non-profits as a 
nexus between business and government, shifting the focus to conflicts and synergy among 
multiple stakeholders. Second, we contribute to the political embeddedness perspective by 
developing a contingency theory of political influence on non-profit organizations.  
A Multi-stakeholder Perspective of Non-profit Organizations  
First, while few studies examine the mechanisms that aggravate or mitigate conflict between 
stakeholders (for exception, see Ni et al., 2014; Tantalo and Priem, 2016), we make a unique 
contribution to stakeholder theory by advancing a multi-stakeholder perspective of non-profit 
organizations and conceiving of them as a nexus between business and government. Our study 
demonstrates that governments are important stakeholders for non-profit organizations, not only 
insofar as they directly enable and constrain organizational activity and performance. They also 
indirectly shape organizational success by influencing relations with other stakeholders such as 
corporate donors. In other words, it is insufficient to consider the relationship between non-profit 
organizations and the government in isolation. In advancing this perspective, we suggest that 
organizational success depends on the ability of the focal organization to create synergy across 
its diverse stakeholders, such as government and business.  
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The problem of having to manage conflicting stakeholder expectations is particularly salient 
for non-profits that typically have “more complex and varied constituencies” than for-profit 
firms (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990: 150). Our results provide empirical support for synergy 
between two stakeholder groups in non-profits, but also highlight boundary conditions under 
which such synergy is hard to achieve. In a nutshell, ties to the government at the personal level 
expose non-profits to greater risk of value expropriation in the eyes of corporate donors. In 
addition, our multi-stakeholder perspective recognizes that not all donors are alike; how they 
evaluate charities’ political ties is shaped by their own needs for political legitimacy. While 
organizational success is more systematically linked to organizational embeddedness than 
personal embeddedness, the effect is stronger for domestic firms who stand to gain more from 
supporting legitimate causes. In contrast, foreign firms seem less able to discriminate between 
the forms of charities’ political ties.  
Furthermore, the study’s focus on the dual mechanisms of political legitimacy and 
misappropriation risks helps clarify the major channels through which organizations create 
value—but potentially do not capture all that value—when trying to address the interests of 
multiple stakeholder groups. These findings allow us to engage and extend a conversation in 
exploring potential channels in creating synergy across different stakeholder groups (Ni et al., 
2014; Tantalo and Priem, 2016).  
A Contingency Theory of Political Embeddedness and Non-profits 
Second, we develop a contingency theory of political influence on non-profits, distinguishing 
two forms of political embeddedness that have differential effects on organizational success. By 
delineating organizational political embeddedness and personal political embeddedness, we 
explain why not all political ties are equally valuable to non-profit organizations. Organizational 
27 
 
embeddedness, which arises through formal affiliation with the government, helps charities build 
relations with business because it offers corporate donors the opportunity to gain legitimacy. In 
contrast, we find no evidence that personal embeddedness, which arises through personal 
involvement of politicians in a charity, is of value to charities. Donors appear sensitive to the risk 
of political insiders appropriating donations for private gain. Furthermore, we highlight that the 
effect of political embeddedness on a charity’s success depends on the identity of its corporate 
donors. 
 The distinction between organizational political embeddedness and personal political 
embeddedness matters because it helps to reconcile divergent scholarly findings on the benefits 
and liabilities of political ties in emerging markets (Peng and Luo, 2000). Organizational 
embeddedness accounts for many of the benefits that arise when corporate donors seek their own 
political legitimacy by donating to approved causes (Zhan and Tang, 2016). Personal 
embeddedness accounts for the risks that arise when politically connected insiders engage in 
value appropriation (Sun et al., 2016). By combining both constructs, scholars are better able to 
predict when organizations will benefit from their political ties. 
These findings for organizational and personal political embeddedness are not unique to 
China. Just as we discern potential negative effects from political ties in the Chinese context, 
Siegel (2007: 621) uncovers the “dark side of embeddedness” in South Korea following regime 
changes which alter the value of CEOs’ personal connections. This recalls our finding that 
personal political embeddedness is not systematically related to fundraising success and that the 
lack of stability of personal relations may be a contributing factor. Reciprocal favors are relevant 
in China where guanxi—personalized networks of influence—involve two-way obligations. Yet, 
as Puffer and colleagues (2010) point out, similar personalized networks of influence exist in 
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countries as diverse as Brazil and Russia. 
The distinction has particular importance for the strategy of non-profit organizations. When 
conducting their missions, non-profit organizations routinely have contact with governments, are 
subject to government-designed regulation and incentives, and rely on various forms of 
government support. It can be tempting to view political ties as a panacea in helping non-profits 
advance their goals. By responding to recent calls for a more fine-tuned delineation of 
organization-state relationships (Lester et al., 2008; Zheng, Singh, and Chung., 2017), we 
suggest that caution is warranted. Some political connections offer a generally limited benefit. 
Ties created through government affiliation and through organization leaders differ in their 
strength, scope of influence and stability. As a result, they differ in their capacity to build 
legitimacy and possibly to access resources.  
Practical and Policy Implications 
Our research findings have implications for practice. Non-profit managers should understand that 
although it often pays for charities to build political ties, other important stakeholders may not 
appreciate all forms of political ties. As different political ties are associated with distinct 
benefits and risks, charities must cultivate political ties strategically in order to attract donors and 
enhance their fundraising performance. They need to carefully evaluate potential donors’ need 
for legitimacy and resource access, their fear of possible state intervention, and their intended 
social impact through making donations. Likewise, corporate managers need to evaluate the risks 
and gains associated with making donations to politically connected charities as part of their 
social responsibility and political strategies.    
This study also has important implications for policymakers in emerging markets. 
Governments in these markets must tread a fine path between maintaining heavy control of non-
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profits and actively harnessing the non-profits and businesses to solve social problems. How to 
balance the relations between non-profits and the government is an issue which policymakers in 
emerging markets will need to address as the non-profit sector continues to grow. 
Future Research Directions and Limitations  
Though we studied non-profit organizations, our findings have potential implications for 
corporate political strategy and stakeholder management. The strategic use of philanthropy is 
valuable for cementing relationships with governments (Wang and Qian, 2011; Zhang et al., 
2016). Studies have tended to focus on support for specific causes or philanthropy following 
major disasters (Luo, Zhang, and Marquis, 2016; Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Tilcsik and Marquis, 
2013). Here, the recipients are treated as uniform. Yet, charitable organizations differ 
enormously, and their heterogeneity influences corporate donors in selecting whom to support in 
pursuit of political legitimacy. We thus encourage explicit consideration of how heterogeneity in 
donation recipients (i.e. charities) influences the effectiveness of corporate political strategy.  
Future studies could advance the insights of the present research through access to fine-
grained data about corporate donors, their ownership, their industry affiliations, or their own 
political connections. For example, how do state-owned companies differ from privately-held 
companies in their donation behavior? Whilst our study theorizes about the benefits and risks 
associated with political ties and demonstrates consistent associations, it cannot conclusively 
demonstrate the exact mechanisms through which they operate. Doing so is a promising avenue 
for research. Future research may study aspects relating to how politically connected insiders 
expropriate value from a charitable organization. Demonstrating causality in this context is 
challenging while field experiments are becoming one approach to assess donation behavior.  
While we take advantage of some unique contextual factors related to China, our research 
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responds to calls to deepen our understanding of contexts that shape organizational behavior 
across the globe. We encourage efforts to replicate this study in other contexts, including 
developed markets. Findings from emerging markets can shed light, under certain conditions, on 
happenings in developed markets. In mature economies, public trust in governments declined in 
recent decades (Prakash and Potoski, 2016). This decline in trust raises the interesting idea that 
studies about political relationships in emerging markets might even foreshadow some future 
trends in North America and Europe.  
Finally, though our research context concerns non-profit organizations, the lessons have 
potential implications for for-profit business too. Political connections prove a dual-edged sword 
for corporations from a multi-stakeholder perspective. For example, evidence from Indonesia 
(Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) suggests that political connections hindered politically 
connected firms from obtaining foreign financing as they were regarded with suspicion by 
lenders in more developed markets. Also, Chinese chipmaker Tsinghua Unigroup benefits from 
government loans to fund research, but its relationship to the national government caused 
consternation in the U.S. when it was reported to be making a bid for Intel (Carsten and Lee, 
2015). There is scope to employ the multi-stakeholder perspective to analyze such cases. 
Conclusion 
Non-profit organizations face the challenge of maintaining productive relations with multiple 
stakeholders, including government (which provides legitimacy and regulates conduct) and 
business (which provides financial resources). We advance a multi-stakeholder perspective that 
identifies how charities’ political relations indirectly influence the behavior of corporate donors. 
Political ties formed through organizational affiliation with a political body (organizational 
political embeddedness) help charities attract corporate donors that seek legitimacy. In contrast, 
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ties formed through personal positional interlocks (individual political embeddedness) have less 
influence on donors who perceive a high risk of connected insiders engaging in activities of 
dubious legality. Our study represents a step in the direction of investigating stakeholder 
management in the nexus of non-profit organizations, for-profit business, and government.  
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Figure 1. Framework of Political Embeddedness and Corporate Donations
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Table 1. Organizational Consequences of Political Ties *  
 For-profit firms Non-profit organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developed 
markets 
 Benefits: 
- Market access (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; 
Roy, 1981) 
- Influence on regulations (Bonardi et al., 
2006) 
- Legitimacy (Hillman et al., 1999) 
- Privileged access to resources 
e.g. Subsidies (Bertrand et al., 2004); 
Government contracts (Goldman et al., 2009); 
Information (Lester et al., 2008) 
 
 Costs/ Risks: 
- Alter business decisions to bestow favors 
on politicians (Bertrand et al., 2004) 
- Increased information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders (Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013) 
 
 Benefits: 
- Privileged access to resources (Lipsky and 
Smith, 1989) 
- Learning effects (Selsky and Parker, 2005) 
 
 
 Costs/ Risks: 
- Government intervention (Beyers and 
Kerreman, 2012; Selsky and Parker, 2005) 
- Used by government to affect society 
(Rathgeb and Lipsky, 1993) 
- Democracy and equality concerns 
(Huxham and Vangen, 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging 
markets 
 Benefits: 
- Market access (Frynas, Mellahi, and 
Pigman, 2006; Malik and Kotabe, 2009; Zhu 
and Chung, 2014) 
- Influence on regulations (Gomez and Jomo, 
1997; Zheng et al., 2017) 
- Legitimacy (Marquis and Qian, 2014) 
- Privileged access to resources 
e.g. Access to credit (Haveman et al., 2017; 
Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006); Government contract (Johnson 
and Mitton, 2003) 
- Filling institutional void as intermediaries 
(Luo and Chung, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; 
Peng and Luo, 2000) 
 
 Costs/ Risks: 
- Government intervention (Okhmatovskiy, 
2010) 
- Appropriation of firm wealth by 
blockholders (Sun et al., 2016) 
- Closer monitoring by governments 
(Marquis and Qian, 2014) 
- Hinders growth during political change 
(Siegel, 2007) 
- Limits knowledge exchange with market 
actors (Li, Xia, and Zajac, 2017) 
 Benefits: 
- Privileged access to resources (Johnson 
and Ni, 2015; Ni and Zhan, 2017; Zhan and 
Tang, 2016) 
- Policy advocacy and broadened service 
scope (Zhan and Tang, 2016) 
 
 
 Costs/ Risks: 
- Legitimacy concerns (Tortajada, 2016) 
- Independence concerns (Brinkerhoff, 
1999) 
 
 
* Cross-country studies (e.g., Faccio, 2006) are not included in this table.   
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Table 2. Charitable Organizations in China, 2005-2012  
Year Population of 
Charities a 
# of Charities in 
the database 
(percentage of 
population) 
Total corporate 
donations received b 
(percentage of  
total donation) 
Donations 
from foreign 
firms b 
Donations 
from 
domestic 
firms b 
Government 
subsidy b 
Charities 
affiliated with 
government 
Charities with 
personal 
political ties c 
2005 890 427 (48%) 204.34 (67.6%) 45.26  159.08  39.47 102 0 
2006 1055 563 (53%) 357.78 (57.4%) 52.45  305.33  68.77 130 2 
2007 1274 922 (72%) 634.2 (49.0%) 76.11  558.09  157.27 202 91 
2008 1521 1218 (80%) 1203.68 (50.4%) 134.56  1069.12  237.02 253 124 
2009 1815 1456 (80%) 1251.56 (54.9%) 163.12  1088.44  249.98 281 127 
2010 2196 1762 (80%) 2285.02 (63.5%) 253.80  2031.22  277.02 335 191 
2011 2592 2592 (100%) 2790.14 (65.7%) 303.80  2486.34  403.42 484 135 
2012 3045 2989 (98%) 3315.09 (75.3%) 190.92  3124.17  524.17 541 233 
Notes: 
 
a. Information source: the statistics are from China Foundation Center, as of 09/02/2017. 
 
b. In US$ millions, converted from Renminbi using year-end exchange rates. 
 
c. Personal ties (i.e. personal political embeddedness) are created by senior leaders of the charities that took or had previously taken senior 
positions in:  
(1) The government. Senior positions in the State Council of China consist of the premier, vice-premiers, councilors, ministers, the auditor-
general, and the secretary-general. For ministries, commissions, and bureaus under the leadership of the State Council, senior positions include 
heads, deputy heads, and teams of principal officials. 
(2) The Communist Party. Senior positions are limited to members in the Central Committee of the party or the equivalent committee at the 
provincial level.   
(3) The National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the two legislative bodies in China. 
Senior positions include elected members in these two bodies or their equivalents at the provincial level.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Total corporate donations (US$ mil.) 1.000                    
2 Foreign corporate donations (US$ mil.) 0.591 1.000                   
3 Domestic corporate donations (US$ mil.) 0.954 0.322 1.000                  
4 Political embeddedness (dummy) 0.063 0.032 0.062 1.000                 
5 Organizational political embeddedness 
(dummy) 
0.010 -0.007 0.014 0.874 1.000                
6 Personal political embeddedness (#) 0.067 0.043 0.063 0.173 0.110 1.000               
7 Size (logged total assets) 0.322 0.150 0.322 0.098 0.092 0.130 1.000              
8 Age 0.103 0.068 0.096 0.117 0.120 0.103 0.278 1.000             
9 Public qualification (dummy) 0.045 0.002 0.052 0.158 0.173 0.087 0.266 0.399 1.000            
10 National 0.282 0.151 0.275 0.202 0.120 0.263 0.338 0.169 0.075 1.000           
11 Number of service domains 0.159 0.069 0.160 0.041 0.056 0.062 0.111 0.053 -0.131 0.229 1.000          
12 Audit quality (dummy) 0.119 0.064 0.116 0.050 0.023 0.084 0.148 0.084 -0.045 0.260 0.108 1.000         
13 Professionalization 0.167 0.091 0.162 0.115 0.142 0.137 0.240 0.208 0.113 0.280 0.220 0.097 1.000        
14 Fundraising expenditure (logged) 0.210 0.109 0.205 0.127 0.116 0.086 0.295 0.122 0.132 0.188 0.145 0.067 0.197 1.000       
15 Government subsidy (logged) 0.059 0.039 0.055 0.160 0.160 0.090 0.161 0.160 0.303 0.021 -0.062 -0.002 0.069 0.127 1.000      
16 Public donations (logged) 0.257 0.198 0.228 -0.012 -0.026 0.014 0.260 0.045 0.044 0.069 0.061 0.020 0.119 0.089 0.023 1.000     
17 Provincial GDP per capita 0.104 0.045 0.105 0.030 0.014 0.039 0.179 0.013 -0.173 0.267 0.074 0.171 -0.038 0.014 -0.044 0.010 1.000    
18 Institutional development 0.005 0.000 0.006 -0.090 -0.080 -0.028 0.142 -0.051 -0.111 -0.003 0.003 0.049 -0.040 -0.086 -0.045 0.048 0.651 1.000   
19 Male ratio -0.016 -0.011 -0.015 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.066 -0.018 0.083 0.030 -0.164 0.006 -0.003 -0.017 0.065 -0.002 -0.068 -0.325 1.000  
20 Leader age 0.064 0.046 0.057 0.196 0.154 0.144 0.213 0.373 0.177 0.180 0.000 0.133 0.035 0.038 0.119 0.017 0.140 -0.285 0.218 1.000 
Mean 1.59 0.18 1.41 0.41 0.19 0.11 16.02 7.98 0.49 0.08 1.49 0.11 0.35 1.89 1.85 6.25 4.91 8.92 0.79 52.30 
S.D. 8.62 2.72 7.34 0.49 0.40 0.74 1.41 7.34 0.50 0.28 0.96 0.31 0.29 3.53 4.30 6.06 2.10 1.78 0.18 6.35 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.89 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.54 0.29 0 29 
Max. 255.64 177.15 195.40 1 1 36 21.90 33 1 1 6 1 1 15.44 18.76 18.86 9.81 11.8 1 83 
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Table 4. Random-Effects GLS Models with Heckman Selection: Political Embeddedness 
and Fundraising Performance of Chinese Charities, 2005-2012 
 
DV: Total corporate donations 
(logged) 
 DV: Donations from foreign firm 
(logged) 
 DV: Donations from domestic 
firms (logged) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  H1 H2   H3a H3b   H3a H3b 
Political embeddedness  1.13    0.44    1.21  
  (0.000)    (0.002)    (0.000)  
Organizational political    1.16    0.53    1.22 
embeddedness   (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000) 
Personal political    -0.02    0.07    -0.01 
embeddedness   (0.713)    (0.118)    (0.914) 
Size 0.16 0.11 0.11  0.26 0.22 0.22  0.15 0.11 0.10 
 (0.014) (0.135) (0.143)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.023) (0.157) (0.164) 
Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.096) (0.064) (0.059)  (0.013) (0.081) (0.081)  (0.035) (0.029) (0.026) 
Public qualification 0.54 0.06 0.00  -0.17 -0.36 -0.42  0.55 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.003) (0.787) (0.985)  (0.207) (0.024) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.897) (0.916) 
National 1.58 1.57 1.61  1.45 1.55 1.50  1.49 1.44 1.47 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Service domains number 0.20 0.20 0.19  0.63 0.60 0.60  0.11 0.11 0.10 
 (0.214) (0.241) (0.257)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.518) (0.516) (0.543) 
Audit quality -0.25 -0.22 -0.22  0.26 0.28 0.28  -0.31 -0.27 -0.28 
 (0.191) (0.257) (0.252)  (0.097) (0.074) (0.080)  (0.110) (0.154) (0.149) 
Professionalization 1.81 1.81 1.80  0.98 0.85 0.85  1.90 1.95 1.93 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fundraising expenditures 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.05 0.04 0.04  0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Government subsidy -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.408) (0.270) (0.246)  (0.577) (0.840) (0.897)  (0.497) (0.360) (0.326) 
Public donations 0.10 0.09 0.09  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior fundraising  0.39 0.39 0.39  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.39 0.39 0.39 
performance (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Provincial GDP per capita 0.15 0.14 0.11  0.02 -0.06 -0.06  0.17 0.18 0.16 
 (0.022) (0.255) (0.338)  (0.675) (0.563) (0.575)  (0.011) (0.132) (0.185) 
Institutional development -0.11 -0.09 -0.08  -0.12 -0.06 -0.06  -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 
 (0.027) (0.254) (0.307)  (0.001) (0.367) (0.372)  (0.042) (0.219) (0.269) 
Inverse Mill's ratio  -0.08 -0.13   -0.28 -0.26   0.01 -0.05 
  (0.803) (0.674)   (0.313) (0.342)   (0.983) (0.882) 
Service domain dummies Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.22 0.37 0.42  -3.90 -3.51 -3.51  0.02 0.05 0.10 
 (0.846) (0.759) (0.733)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.984) (0.968) (0.936) 
Observations 6,607 6,607 6,607  6,607 6,607 6,607  6,607 6,607 6,607 
Number of foundations 2,054 2,054 2,054  2,054 2,054 2,054  2,054 2,054 2,054 
Wald chi2 3199*** 3318*** 3325***  232.5*** 238.4*** 241.5***  3002*** 3144*** 3146*** 
p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001           
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Appendix A. Field Data Collection Overview 
 
In mid-2017, we collected field data to supplement our quantitative analysis. Our investigation 
involved 13 interviews as well as the collection of archival data. Specifically, we interviewed 
senior representatives from seven philanthropic foundations. In addition, we interviewed the 
representatives of one publicly listed company as a major corporate donor, three government 
officials and two industry experts. Interviews took place in either Beijing or Shenzhen, two 
important cities in China for politics, business, and the development of civil society.  
 
The aim of the interviews was to gain deeper insight into our quantitative analysis and to 
ascertain how experts in the field would explain our theorizing and our findings (e.g. 
Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read, 2015). Interviews were open-ended but centered on why 
foundations were able, or unable, to attract donations and why corporations would donate to a 
particular foundation rather than another. In Table Appendix A-1, we provide details of the 
foundations that were interviewed, outlining the variance in terms of their foundation and their 
political affiliation (if any).  
 
Table Appendix A-1. Foundation interviewees 
 
  Interview 
Hours 
Interviewee 
Number 
Founding 
Time 
Initial 
Endowment 
Org.  
Type  
Registration 
Level 
Founders’ 
Backgrounds 
Interviewees’ 
Positions 
Foundation 
#1 
2 2 1988/06 9.95 million 
RMB 
Public Provincial Government General secretary 
& Vice General 
secretary 
Foundation 
#2 
1 1 2008/07 100 million 
RMB 
Non-public ministry of 
civil affairs 
Community Former Senior 
project manager 
Foundation 
#3 
1.5 1 2012/07 4 million 
RMB 
Public Municipal Individuals Vice General 
secretary 
Foundation 
#4 
1 1 2012/10 50 million 
RMB 
Non-public ministry of 
civil affairs 
Corporation Former General 
secretary 
Foundation 
#5 
1 1 2012/11 10 million 
RMB 
Public Municipal Government General secretary 
Foundation 
#6 
1.5 1 2014/12 10 million 
RMB 
Non-public Municipal Government General secretary 
Foundation 
#7 
1.5 2 2015/11 2 million 
RMB 
Non-public Municipal Corporation General secretary 
& Senior project 
manager 
 
REFERENCE 
Kapiszewski D, MacLean LM, Read BL. 2015. Field research in political science: Practices and 
principles. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.  
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Appendix B. First Stage Probit Regressions on the Establishment of Personal Political 
Embeddedness  
 
DV: Personal political 
embeddedness (0/1) 
Coefficient p-value 
Male ratio -0.73 (0.000) 
Leader age 0.05 (0.000) 
Size  0.11 (0.000) 
Age  0.00 (0.290) 
Public qualification -0.06 (0.172) 
National  -0.51 (0.000) 
Number of service domains 0.10 (0.013) 
Audit quality  -0.09 (0.083) 
Professionalization  0.82 (0.000) 
Fundraising expenditures 0.01 (0.000) 
Government subsidy 0.01 (0.000) 
Public donations -0.01 (0.001) 
Prior fundraising performance 0.00 (0.213) 
Provincial GDP per capita 0.41 (0.000) 
Institutional development  -0.26 (0.000) 
Constant -1.64 (0.000) 
Service domain dummies Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  
Observations 6,154 6,154 
LR chi2 3192*** 3192*** 
Log-likelihood -2895 -2895 
p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001  
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Appendix C. Effects of Political Embeddedness on Total Donations, Foreign Donations, and 
Domestic Donations Received by Chinese Charities  
   
 
   
 
   
Note: The error bars depict a 95% confidence interval. 
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